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Abstract. The Quantum Key Distribution protocol can encode a single quantum
state and implements an information-theoretically secure key distribution protocol
in communication. In the actual QKD experimental system, there are usually two
encoding methods which are phase encoding and polarization encoding. Ma et
al.[Phase-Matching Quantum Key Distribution, Phys. Rev. X., 2018, 83)] proposed
the phase-matching QKD protocol, which has high transmission and it is an extension
of the measurement device independent QKD. This paper successfully gives the
polarization scheme of this PM-QKD protocol, the bases in the polarization scheme
are arbitrary, and eliminates detector side channel attacks. Furthermore, we give the
security analysis and simulation results of the polarization scheme, and compare it
with the BB84 protocol. The simulation results show that our protocol is superior to
the BB84 protocol in terms of transmission distance under the fixed key rate.
PACS numbers: 00.00, 20.00, 42.10
Keywords: Quantum key distribution, Polarization scheme, PM-QKD protocol, BB84
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution(QKD) technology is the main way to realize quantum secure
communication at present, and it is very important to carry out research on it. In
1984, Bennett and Brassard proposed the first QKD protocol [1](BB84 protocol) . It
encodes four polarization states of photons, whose polarization states can be divided
into two groups of conjugated groups. Also, the two polarization states of each group are
orthogonal to each other. For example, the two pairs of bases can be a horizontal vertical
basis {0◦, 90◦} and a diagonal basis {45◦, 135◦}, respectively. The specific process of
QKD is as follows:
(1)Alice encodes the key information to be transmitted into the polarization state
of the photon according to the encoding rule, and sends it to the receiver.
(2)Bob randomly selects the Z-basis or X-basis measurement for the received
photons. Regardless of the measurement basis he uses, he is counted as 0 as long
as he gets the first result of the Z or X basis; the second result is recorded as 1.
(3)When all photons are sent, Alice and Bob tell each other’s respective bases
sequences through the classic channel.
(4)They discard the data of different basis, then correction and secret amplification
of the remaining data.
In the process of QKD protocol, some protocols and mersurement basis are needed
to transport in the classical channel in order to assist the communication parties to
obtain the final secure quantum key sequence. Therefore, the BB84 protocol has a risk
that the measurement basis is stolen in the classical channel. In 1992, Bennett et al.
proposed the B92 protocol, which only needs to use two polarization states [2], and there
is no need to ensure that they are orthogonal to each other. That process is similar to
the BB84 protocol, but there is no basis step in the subsequent processing, so the risk
of theft for the measurement basis can be avoided. However, since the receiver can
only correctly receive 25% of the results, which results in extremely low transmission
efficiency.
Most of the light sources used in the above two polarization protocols are weak
coherent states, rather than ideal single photon sources, resulting in photon number
separation attacks(PNS) [3]. On the other hand, for photon detectors, there are time-
shift attacks [4], faked states attacks [5], blind attacks [6], and so on. In response to
these attacks, different improvement protocols were proposed. For example, for the
imperfection of the light source, the decoy protocol [7-9] was proposed. Similarly, for
the detector attack, the measurement device independent QKD(MDI-QKD)[10] was
proposed by Lo et al. in 2012. The MDI-QKD protocol not only eliminates attacks on
the detector side channel, but also has the ability to double the transmission distance.
However, its key rate is still O(η), where is the total transmission between Alice and
Bob (ie the probability that a photon is successfully transmitted through the channel
and detected). In order to improve the key rate, scholars have continuously improved
the MDI-QKD protocol. In 2018, M. Lucamarini, Z.L. Yuan et al. proposed a twin-field
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QKD (TF-QKD)[11] protocol based on the phase MDI-QKD protocol [12]. The coding
of the protocol is based on two sets of orthogonal basis vectors and is an extension of
the BB84 protocol. The random phase is added to the protocol, so it can not only
resist photon number separation attacks and detector attacks, but also increase the key
rate from O(η) to O(
√
η). However, the security of the TF-QKD protocol has not been
proven. Ma Xiongfeng et al. proposed a phase-matching QKD (PM-QKD) [13] protocol
which is immune to all possible measurement attacks in 2018, and proof of security are
given based on an optical mode.
From the above analysis protocols, the BB84 protocol, the B92 protocol, and the
MDI-QKD protocol are all belong to polarization coding protocols, but the TF-QKD and
PM-QKD protocols are a new phase-coded MDI-QKD protocol. It can be known from
the Ref [14] that phase encoding has the following advantages good stability, strong
anti-interference ability, low bit error rate, etc., so it is widely used in optical fiber
transmission. But the polarization state shift often occurs to cause a decrease in the
interference contrast, resulting in a problem of an increase in the bit error rate. Thus,
polarization coding has significant advantages in space transmission, it has become the
first choice for free-space QKD experiments. However, in the transmission process of
the optical fiber, the birefringence caused by the non-uniformity of the optical fiber
during the drawing process, as well as the curvature of the optical fiber, the ambient
temperature and the stress, etc., the photon polarization state is highly prone to irregular
changes, which in turn destroys the original polarization state coded information of
the photon when the bit error rate of the communication system increase. Therefore,
studying the polarization QKD protocol based on phase encoding and the phase QKD
protocol based on polarization encoding have important significance both in theory and
experiment.
A QKD scheme of the polarization state corresponding to the PM-QKD protocol
is given based on PM-QKD protocol, and its security is analyzed in this paper. It is
organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the PM-QKD protocol, and the phase-encoding
polarization scheme is given in Section 3 and analyzes its security. The Section 4
gives the key rate simulation formula of our scheme and a comparison between the
transmission distances of the two protocols in the case of a fixed key rate.
2. PM-QKD protocol review
In the PM-QKD protocol, the communicating parties Alice and Bob independently
generate coherent state pulses. For a d-phase PM-QKD protocol, Alice and Bob encode
their key information into the phase of the coherent state and send it to an untrusted
measurement location that may be controlled by Eve, as shown in Figure 1. Eve
is expected to perform interferometric measurements, defining successful detection as
having one and only one click in two detectors, denoted as an L click or an R click. The
following is the specific process of the PM-QKD protocol.
(1)State preparation-Alice randomly generates a key bit ka and a random
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phase φa ∈ [0, 2pi),and then prepares a coherent state|√µaei(φa+pika)〉A. Similarly, Bob
generates kb and φb ∈ [0, 2pi), then prepares |√µbei(φb+pikb)〉B.
(2)Measurements-Alice and Bob send their light pulses A and B to an untrusted
Eve, who is expected to perform an interference measurement and record the detector
(L or R) that clicks.
(3)Announcement-Eve announced her detection results. Then Alice and Bob
announce the random phases φa and φb, respectively.
(4)Sifting-Alice and Bob repeat the above steps multiple times. When Eve
announces a successful detection (just one detector L or R click), Alice and Bob make
ka and kb the raw key bits. If Eve declares an R click, Bob flips his key bit kb. Then, as
long as |φa − φb| = 0 or pi, Alice and Bob’s raw key are unchanged; when |φa − φb| = pi,
Bob flips his key bit kb.
(5)Parameter estimation-Alice and Bob analyse the gain Qµ and qubit error rates
EZµ from all of the retained raw data and then estimate E
X
µ using Eq(1) in Ref[15].
EXµ ≤ 1−
e−µ µ
k
k!
× 1
2
(Y01 + Y10)∑∞
k=0 P
µ(k)Yk
. (1)
(6)Key distillation-Alice and Bob perform error correction and secret amplification
on the filtered key bits to generate a private key.
Notations.–Denote a coherent state in mode A to be |√µ
a
eiφ〉A, where µ is the
intensity and φ is the phase, µa = µb =
µ
2
, ka(b) ∈ {0, 1} represents the key bit of Alice
(Bob), total gain Qµ, phase error rate E
X
µ , and bit error rate E
Z
µ .
Figure 1. Illustration of the PM-QKD protocol.
The PM-QKD protocol passes the measurements to a third party, eliminating
detector-side channel attacks. It is an extension of the MDI-QKD protocol, so the
transmission distance is twice that of the BB84 protocol. The key rate of the protocol
is the same as that of the TF-QKD protocol, which is O(
√
η), which is the key rate that
is not reached by other protocols[16-20]. Another advantage of the PM-QKD protocol
is that there is no basis step, eliminating the classic communication between the two
parties. Based on these advantages of the PM-QKD protocol, we give its polarization
scheme.
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3. Polarization scheme based on phase encoding
This section gives our polarization scheme based on phase encoding. In the Section 2,
we know that the coherent state of the PM-QKD protocol is |√µei(φa(b)+pika(b))〉 and its
phase is φa(b) + pika(b), where φa(b) ∈ [0, 2pi) is a random phase, and φa 6= φb.
3.1. Specific process of the polarization scheme
Let φa and φb are both random phases, and their corresponding bases are M
′
1,
M ′2 respectively, where M
′
1, M
′
2 are the bases represented by the polarization state.
Thus, the polarization state corresponding to the random phase is the basis of the
proposed scheme. The specific process is given below. Let M ′1 = {|ψM11〉, |ψM12〉},
M ′2 = {|ψM21〉, |ψM22〉} be two different sets of bases in Bloch ball. The polarization
scheme of the PM-QKD protocol is as follows.
(1)State preparation-Alice and Bob respectively prepare the polarization state of
the photon and independently select the M ′1 or M
′
2 basis encode the key information.
(2)Coding-If the key information transmitted by Alice(or Bob) is 0 ,she(or he)
selects M ′1 basis, the polarization state of the photon is |ψM11〉; if she selects M ′2 basis,
the polarization state of the photon is |ψM21〉; if the key information transmitted by
Alice(or Bob) is 1, she selects M ′1 basis, the polarization state of the photon is |ψM12〉;
if she selects M ′2 basis, the polarization state of the photon is |ψM22〉.
(3)Measurement-Alice and Bob send the photon’s polarization state to Eve, Eve
receives the photon and measures it, recording the click detector (L or R).Eve measures
the polarization states of Alice and Bob. If the phase difference corresponding to the
polarization state is 0 then the click is L; and if the phase difference corresponding to
the polarization state is pi then the click is R.
(4)Announcement-Eve announced the detector results, Alice and Bob announced
their respective basis.
(5)Flip-Alice and Bob repeat the above steps multiple times. When Eve announces
a successful detector click, Alice and Bob make ka and kb the raw key bits. If Eve
declares an R click, Bob flips his key bits.
(6)Base step-Alice and Bob check their bases, then leaving the key bits of M ′1 = M
′
2.
As can be seen from the introduction of this paper that the bases used in the BB84
protocol and the MDI-QKD protocol are both Z-basis or X-basis, as shown in Figure 2,
and the two sets of bases are special. In our scheme, two different sets of bases can be
arbitrarily selected according to the value of the random phase. These two sets of bases
are not necessarily orthogonal, which is the advantage of this scheme.
Here, Alice and Bob are sending coherent states of photons. The corresponding
relationship is as follows: |ψM11〉 ∼ √µeiφa , |ψM12〉 ∼ √µei(φa+pi), |ψM21〉 ∼√
µeiφb , |ψM22〉 ∼ √µei(φb+pi). Phase differences can be measured when the two
communicating parties are sending coherent states.
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Figure 2. The selection of the polarization scheme basis: the red vector in the figure
is the Z basis, the blue vector is the X basis, and the black vector is the arbitrarily
selected basis; it can be seen that the Z basis and the X basis are orthogonal to each
other.
3.2. Example
First, we take θ = pi
2
(θ is the angle between the vector and the Z axis), φa =
pi
6
and
φb =
pi
4
in Figure 2. |0〉 and |1〉 qubit state are the two polarization of Z basis, which
are horizontal polarization state and the vertical polarization state, respectively. Then
the phase
pik + φa =
{
pi
6
, k = 0
7pi
6
, k = 1.
Then the basis corresponding to φa is represented by the phase of the photon as the
M1 = {pi6 , 7pi6 }. According to
|ψ〉 = cos θ
2
|0〉+ eiφ sin θ
2
|1〉,
we can write M1 as polarization state M
′
1 = {|ψM11〉, |ψM12〉}. Similarly, the basis
phase corresponding to the random phase pi
4
is represented by M2 = {pi4 , 5pi4 }, and the
corresponding polarization state is M ′2 = {|ψM21〉, |ψM22〉}. Where
|ψM11〉 =
√
2
2
|0〉+
√
2
2
(
√
3
2
+ 1
2
i)|1〉, |ψM12〉 =
√
2
2
|0〉 −
√
2
2
(
√
3
2
+ 1
2
i)|1〉,
|ψM21〉 =
√
2
2
|0〉+
√
2
2
(
√
2
2
+
√
2
2
i)|1〉, |ψM22〉 =
√
2
2
|0〉 −
√
2
2
(
√
2
2
+
√
2
2
i)|1〉.
In Section 3, the polarization scheme uses only two sets of bases. In fact, when φa(b)
takes a value, it corresponds to a set of bases. The scheme of this paper is roughly the
same as the whole process of the PM-QKD protocol, except that our scheme is belong
to polarization coding and the other is belong to phase coding. Since the two values of
the random phase difference of pi are in the same group basis, the phase sifting step of
the original PM-QKD protocol is the basis step of the polarization scheme.
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3.3. Security analysis
The phase encoding protocol of PM-QKD is due to the publication of the random phase
resulting in the failure of the tagging method used in the photon number channel model
[21] and the Gottsman et al. security proof (GLLP security proof), so the proof of PM-
QKD protocol is based on the optical mode [13]. After we change the phase encoding
protocol of the PM-QKD protocol to the polarization scheme, and the random phase is
the basis, then the tagging method in the photon number channel model and the GLLP
security proof does not fail. It is essentially an extension of the MDI-QKD protocol.
So, the security analysis for our scheme with decoy states follows from that of GLLP
formula[22], which rely on the photon-number channel used in Ref[21]. The key rate for
the our scheme is given by Eq(2).
4. Simulation
In this section, we use the parameters of Table 1 to simulate the performance of this
paper. The comparison between the scheme and the BB84 protocol is given, and the
simulation key rate formula are presented, respectively.
4.1. Simulation formula for polarization scheme
The key rate formula for the polarization scheme of this paper is based on the Ref[23]:
Rpolarization =
1
2
{Q1,1;M ′1 [1−H(e1,1;M ′2)]−QM ′1f(EM ′1)H(EM ′1)} (2)
,
Here,Qn,m;M ′1 , Qn,m;M ′2 , en,m;M ′1 and en,m;M ′2 represent the gain and qubit error rate
of the signals transmitted by Alice and Bob, respectively. Where n and m represent
the number of photons sent by both communicating parties; M ′i(i = 1, 2) represent the
choice of their basis. We selected M ′2 as the test basis and used it to estimate the
quantum bit error rate. Where Q1,1;M ′1 = µaµbe
−µa−µbY1,1;M ′1 , and
1
2
is the basis sifting
factor. In the simulation, the gain and error rate are given by:
Y1,1;M ′1 = (1− pd)2[
ηaηb
2
+ (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)pd + 4(1− ηa)(1− ηb)p2d], (3)
e1,1;M ′1 = e0Y1,1;M ′1 − (e0 − ed)(1− p2d)
ηaηb
2
, (4)
Where e0 is the response error rate caused by the dark count, with e0 =
1
2
, and ed is the
misalignment error rate caused by the phase reference mismatch; pd is the dark count
rate.
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QM ′1 = Q
(D0)
M ′1
+Q
(D1)
M ′1
, (5)
Q
(D0)
M ′1
= 2(1− pd)2e−
µ′
2 [1− (1− pd)e−
ηaµa
2 ]× [1− (1− pd)e−
ηbµb
2 ], (6)
Q
(D1)
M ′1
= 2pd(1− pd)2e−
µ′
2 [I0(2x)− (1− pd)e−
µ′
2 ], (7)
Where I0(x) is the first type of modified Bessel function. For small values of the variable
x a first-order approximation can be used to approximate equation (7).
EM ′1QM ′1 = edQ
(D0)
M ′1
+ (1− ed)Q(D1)M ′1 , (8)
Here,
µ′ = ηaµa + ηbµb, (9)
x =
1
2
√
ηaµaηbµb, (10)
ηa = ηb =
η
2
,µa = µb =
µ
2
, Where µ′ represents the average number of photons arriving
at the Eve beam splitter. QM ′1 and EM ′1 respectively represent the gain of the basis
and the error rate of the qubit (ie, QM ′1 =
∑
n,mQn,m;M ′1 , EM ′1 =
∑
n,mQM ′1en,m;M ′1/QM ′1 ,
f(EM ′1) > 1 is an inefficient function of the error correction process. And H(x) =
−x log x− (1− x) log((1− x)) is the binary Shannon entropy function.
4.2. Simulation formula of BB84 protocol
The key rate formula of the decoy BB84 protocol is given in the Ref [7]:
RBB84 =
1
2
Qµ{−fH(Eµ) + q1[1−H(e1)]}, (11)
Where 1
2
is the basis sifting factor. In the simulation, the yield and error rate of the
k-photon component are given by Ref [13]:
Yk = 1− (1− Y0)(1− η)k, (12)
ek = ed +
(e0 − ed)Y0
Yk
, (13)
The gain and qubit error rate are given by:
Qµ =
∞∑
k=0
µke−µ
k!
Yk = 1− (1− Y0)e−ηµ, (14)
Eµ =
∞∑
k=0
µke−µ
k!
ekYk = ed +
(e0 − ed)Y0
Qµ
, (15)
Where Y0 = 2pd.
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Table 1. Parameters used for simulation .
Parameters Values
Dark count rate pd 8× 10−8
Error correction efficiency f 1.15
Misalignment error ed 1.5%
Detector efficiency ηd 14.5%
4.3. Comparison of the two protocols
In this section, we obtain the simulation(Figure 3) of BB84 protocol and our scheme in
terms of key rate with formulas in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. It can be seen from the image
that the polarization matching scheme based on phase matching exceeds 300 km, and
the transmission distance is larger than the transmission distance of the decoy BB84
protocol when the key rate limit is 10( − 15). And the polarization scheme has the
advantage of not being attacked by the detector side channel. From the perspective of
the light source, the polarization scheme uses the weak coherent pulse source, and the
BB84 protocol uses a single photon source. From this, it can be seen that our scheme
is easy to implement in practice. In the BB84 protocol, the basis used is Z or X basis,
and our scheme uses bases that is not unique, can be multiple sets of non-orthogonal
bases, and is more general. The selection of the polarization scheme basis is shown in
Figure 2. Whenever one value is taken, the polarization scheme has a set of bases.
Figure 3. A simulation of BB84 protocol and our scheme with key rate.
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5. Summary
Based on the PM-QKD protocol, the polarization scheme of the PM-QKD protocol
is given. Also,the key rate formula of its polarization scheme is given. The simulation
results show that our scheme is superior to the BB84 protocol in the case of a certain key
rate, and it has great advantages in the transmission distance and the selection method
of the basis. Our scheme has the advantage of not being attacked by any detectors, and
its key rate is also consistent with the MDI-QKD protocol. However, its key rate is not
as high as the original protocol. How to increase the key rate is still a problem.
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